Olympic Diplomacy and the Emerging States: Striving for Influence in the Multipolar World by Đana Luša
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (79) - 2017
73




Olympic Diplomacy and the Emerging 




The world of sports is a reflection of the world of politics. It is becoming increasingly multipolar with 
the emerging states hosting mega sporting events. Firstly, the article problematizes the concept 
of multipolarity and, secondly, globalisation by questioning whether the Olympic Games reinforce 
national identities and promote national interests by using Olympic diplomacy as a soft power tool. 
In doing so, the article explores the correlation between the changes in international affairs and 
the hosting of and participation at the Olympic Games by emerging states such as Brazil, China and 
Russia. The analysis distinguishes globalisation from the role of the nation-state, by highlighting 
the evident differences between emerging states in terms of hosting the Games, but also takes into 
consideration geopolitical and geo-economic parameters.
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Introduction
This article aims to highlight the shift in contemporary international 
affairs, in which more states present themselves as active participants, 
and where emerging states enjoy an influence beyond their immediate 
region. They do this by challenging the dominance of “old” great powers. 
However, there are different interpretations of the current state of affairs. 
According to Gratius (2008: 1), there are three general tendencies: a 
new international order being simultaneously uni- and multipolar; the 
rise of Asian countries, namely India, China and Japan; and the (re)
enforcement of the nation, state and religion. This increasingly multipolar 
world might be strongly correlated with the influence of “[A]sianisation 
in the economy and consequently in the political power” (Kurečić and 
Kampmark 2016: 91). Furthermore, they predict that the rise of contender 
states will be increasingly greater than the rise of dominant states. This 
will keep feeding into the right circumstances for the creation of a “truly 
multipolar world in the first half of the 21st century” (ibid).
The article argues that a multipolarity is emerging not only in international 
relations, but also in the hosting of the Olympic Games (see more in: Grix 
and Lee 2013: 3). For the most part, International Relations (IR) did not 
ignore the relevance of hosting the Games, which is also the main focus 
of this article. Particularly, there has been a lot of research exploring the 
economics behind the organisation of major sporting events (McBride 
2016; Brunet and Xinwen 2008, Osada et al. 2016, Preuss 2004, Baade and 
Matheson 2015). Although sport does not represent the most frequent 
research interest among IR scholars, with its global outreach and the 
impact on international relations and a state’s soft power, there has been 
an increase in the number of works focusing on the relationship between 
sports and politics (Houlihan 1994, Levermore and Budd 2004; Allison 1986, 
Allison 1993, Arnaud and Riordan 1998, Riordan and Krüger 1999). This 
article contributes to this trend by analysing emerging states’ Olympic 
diplomacy as a soft power tool in the multipolar world.
The first question to address when speaking about the role of the Olympics 
Games is why they are being used as a case study to explore the concept 
of multipolarity? It is primarily because the Olympics represent the biggest 
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sporting event in the world, while the outreach of the Games and the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) into areas outside of sport is 
unmatched. “The Games symbolise one of the largest single gatherings of 
humans, sporting games, festivals, rituals and grand spectacle all wrapped 
in one intense, colourful and often controversial extravaganza” (Kelly in 
Kelly and Brownell 2011: 1), while the IOC with its status presents itself as 
a diplomatic actor in the international community. The article therefore 
argues that by hosting and participating at the Olympics, and by using 
Olympic diplomacy, emerging states may signal future opportunities of 
enhancing their agency in global multipolar affairs (Grix and Lee 2013). 
The article addresses several issues: first and foremost, the reasons behind 
using Olympic diplomacy and the bidding of emerging states to host the 
Olympic Games are questioned; as well as what this phenomenon says 
about the significance of the Games and the shift in the international 
order. Is there a correlation between hosting the games by the emerging 
states and the multipolarity of international affairs? Secondly, the article 
will try to answer whether nation-states still play a strong role in trying to use 
Olympic diplomacy to promote their particular interests and strengthen 
their national identity in the globalised world (considering their success 
in hosting and participating at the Games). The article explores cases in 
which three BRICS states hosted the Olympic Games: China in 2008, Russia 
in 2014, and Brazil in 2016. 
The main hypotheses are the following:
 ● Although mega sporting events represent cultural, economic 
and political phenomena considered as “main contributors to 
the unifying process of globalization” (Koorep 2016), sport is never 
detached from the concept of nation. This means that the Olympic 
Games and Olympic diplomacy contribute to the heterogeneous 
side of globalisation by reinforcing national sentiment, nationalist 
ideas and identities, particularly in the case of emerging states.
 ● The world is becoming increasingly multipolar, which is mirrored in 
the hosting of mega sporting events being awarded to emerging 
countries. Using Olympic diplomacy and winning the bidding 




o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (79) - 2017
76
Theoretical framework
To define the structure of current international affairs, one needs to start 
with the term ‘polarity’. “Polarity is a distribution of power among actors 
in the international system” (Toje 2010: 7). According to Mearsheimer 
(2001: 4) “unipolarity is a system with only one great power, which needs 
to be able to put up a ‘serious fight’ against the leading state”. Monteiro 
(2014: 8) argues that the international system will remain unipolar, “as long 
as the United States remain the only state with substantial global power 
capacity, or as long as Beijing chooses not to use its resources to develop a 
superpower’s military capability.” Multipolarity, on the other hand, refers to 
a “[d]istribution of power in which more than two powers have comparable 
amounts of military, cultural and economic influence”. It is characterised 
by the absence of supranational organising principles (Toje 2010: 7). 
According to Buzan’s (2004: 69) prediction, the United States (US) “has 
been the only superpower and there are no other candidates on the 
horizon for that status for at least a couple of decades.” In his work he 
coded Russia, China, Japan and the European Union as great powers. 
On the other hand, many authors argue that with the shift towards 
multipolarity, a singular category of a “superpower” and emerging 
powers are defining a new plural category, that of “great powers”. This 
new category could potentially consist of countries such as the US, China, 
India, Japan, Russia and the European Union. According to Cooper and 
Alexandroff (2010: 2), multipolarity emerges from several shifts within the 
contemporary global order. Firstly, the US dominated liberal international 
order is being seriously challenged. Secondly, international institutions are 
facing a fundamental crisis of efficiency. Thirdly, there are serious issues 
regarding leadership. And fourthly and finally, the world is witnessing the 
emergence of new powers, namely in China, India and Brazil. Stephens 
(2009) uses the phrase “the crunching and gridding of geopolitical plates” 
for all the above-mentioned changes and all the new actors emerging on 
the global scene. Adding to this, we may add the hosting of the Olympic 
Games which has shifted from the West to the emerging states. 
However, one might ask which states can actually be called emerging 
powers? According to Cooper and Flemes (2013: 945), several countries 
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can be perceived as such, as there is no precise definition of countries 
within this club. Therefore, different acronyms are both used and 
contested, such as BRIC1, BRICS2, BASIC3, and BRICSAM4. In this article, the 
BRICS states are being referred to as the emerging powers.
We understand globalisation as a concept which captures complex 
interrelations between the local and the global introduced and explained 
among others by Brannagan and Giulianotti (2015: 705) with the concept 
of ‘glocalisation’ and ‘glocal consciousness’, which refers to “how nation-
states position themselves vis-a vis processes of globalization”. This is 
particularly evident from using Olympic diplomacy by emerging states 
in order to change their international image, strengthen their national 
identity, or to position themselves on the global stage, which will be further 
addressed in the article. 
In many cases, hosting the Games is perceived as a strategy relying on 
soft power. However, Nye’s concept, applied to the case of the US is 
challenging to apply to all other cases. Namely, the results of soft power 
strategy often take much longer and its instruments are not fully under 
the control of governments (Nye in Cooper et al. 2013: 568). According to 
Shambaugh (2013) “soft power is not created by investing billions in global 
sports events. It is not a tool than can be purchased in a World Politics 
Shop”. In the article, we use Nye’s concept of soft power to understand 
emerging states’ Olympic diplomacy and the attempts to increase their 
role in multipolar international relations, through hosting and participating 
at the Olympic Games. 
One of the ways that governments wield soft power is through sport 
diplomacy, mostly manifested as public, indirect diplomacy. It is 
developed to communicate with the publics of other countries in order 
to influence their governments indirectly. Emerging states use its sub-
category (Olympic diplomacy) in order to win the bid for hosting the 
Olympic Games. However, no universal definition of sport diplomacy 
1 BRIC consists of Brazil, Russia, India and China.
2 South Africa formally joined with Brazil, Russia, India and China to create BRICS at a summit in 2011.
3 Became known in the context of the Copenhagen Conference of Climate Change Control (negotiations with the 
United States). Consist of Brazil, South Africa, India and China.
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exists, where some scholars consider it as subcultural diplomacy, while 
others think of it as public diplomacy influencing the mass audience and 
creating the image of the state. We define sport diplomacy as a range 
of formal and informal actions focused at implementing foreign policy 
through sport. For instance, this could mean to either endorse or condemn 
large sporting events; to strengthen nationalist sentiments; develop or 
refine the concepts of nation-states and national identities; but also, to 
communicate political messages, promote dialogue and encourage 
integration within multicultural societies (Luša in Jović 2016: 229-283). The 
term Olympic diplomacy is usually equated with the term sport diplomacy 
and referring to the diplomatic role and policies of the IOC. In this article we 
approach Olympic diplomacy from the unit level, defining it as an effort 
made by states to win the bid for hosting and successfully participating 
at the Games; to promote historical and cultural heritage before, after 
and especially during the Games; to raise their significance and power in 
international relations by scoring the greatest results; and by, winning as 
many medals as possible, as well as to achieve economic benefits from 
hosting the Games. 
The Olympic Games as the intersection of 
nationalism, globalization and universal values
Debates about the nation-states and globalisation are very common in IR 
literature (Berger; 2001, Reis 2004; Smith 2001). Anderson (2006: 3) argues 
that “nation-ness is the most universally-legitimate value in the political 
life of our time” while globalists “underline the weakening of the territorial 
boundaries of nation-states due to the certain economic, political and 
social forces being able to elude nation-state control”. Concepts of 
nationalism and globalisation are themselves being disputed. Some 
scholars even reject the globalisation paradigm. Bairner (2001: 5-6), on the 
contrary, argues that: “we live in a post-national world in which distinctive 
identities based on the idea of nation are being eroded and an ever-
increasing homogenization is occurring”. 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (79) - 2017
79
The area in which nationalism and globalisation are much-discussed 
concepts is the study of sport. Therefore, this section of the article 
investigates the extent to which hosting of the Olympic Games can 
be used for the strengthening of national identity and the expression 
of nationalism by the emerging states in the context of globalisation. 
Namely, one cannot disconnect nationalism from competition, as the 
basis of the Olympic Games is built on the premise of nation-states and 
national organisations, while also underscoring the ethos of the Games as 
human unity (Malia 2014: 3). 
Allison (in Allison 2005: 2) argues that: “there is a global system of cores 
and peripheries in which leading sportsmen from peripheries rarely 
play in their country of origin”, which indicates interrelation between 
globalisation and sport. Furthermore, in the capital market, different 
nationals and interest groups become owners of national sporting clubs. 
The Olympics, according to Tomlinson (in Allison 2005: 45) operate “as a 
giant billboard for the elite crop of multi-national corporations that are the 
preferred sponsorship partners of the IOC.” “This serves the interest of five 
simultaneous processes, which characterize the present moment in sport: 
globalization, governmentalization, Americanization, televisualization 
and commodification” (Miller et al. 2001: 41). These economic, political 
and cultural dimensions’ intermesh in phenomena such as the Olympics 
symbolising the strengths of globalisation. 
Good showcases of globalisation in sports are Michael Phelps5, Serena 
Williams6, Roger Federer7 and Usain Bolt8, who are cheered for around 
the globe, because of their extraordinary sporting results. At the Olympic 
Games in Rio 2016, universal human values were additionally shared with 
heart-warming images of the Olympic Refugees Team competing in 
recognition of the 60 million refugees around the world. A great example 
of the Olympic spirit was also a scene during the qualifying heat of the 
women’s 5000 meters, when New Zealand and American runners Nikki 
Hambin and Abbey D’Agostino “set aside their own hopes and national 
5 Michael Phelps is an American swimmer who won the most Olympic medals in history.
6 Serena Williams is an American tennis player who occupies 2nd place in number of Grand Slams won in the Open Era. 
7 Roger Federer is a Swiss tennis player who won 19 Grand Slam single titles, the most in history. Among other 
achievements he holds a record of 302 weeks being the number one on the ATP rankings list.
8 Usain Bolt is a Jamaican sprinter and a nine-time Olympic gold medalist. In 2016 he became the first track athlete 
in modern Olympics to win gold medals in two individual disciplines at three consecutive Olympic games, which he 
achieved in the 100m and 200m sprint. 
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interests of making the finals to look out for a fellow competitor” (Imray 
2016). They have been praised for embodying the Olympic spirit (Roy 
2016). This proves the universal spirit of the Olympic Games, which is 
additionally strengthened by Maguire (2009: 5-6), who argues that “given 
the growth in the multiplicity of linkages that transcend the nation-states, 
we may be at the earliest stages of the development of a “transnational 
culture” or a “global culture”. Koorep (2016:17) takes the view that “the 
mega sporting events provide us with a magnifying glass on the process 
of globalization”.
To summarize: firstly, globalisation in sport is a reality, due to virtually 
omnipresent modes of communication. Around 342 million people 
watched the opening ceremony of the Rio Games in 2016, while the Beijing 
opening had more than 1 billion viewers (Roxborough 2016). Secondly, the 
rules of the game are understood by almost everyone. Thirdly, global sports 
present an excellent equaliser from the equal opportunities perspective. 
Namely, sport is supposed to be available to everyone, at least its basic 
forms or its amateur level (Marmolejo 2012). These arguments speak in 
favour of globalisation being very much present in sport. 
On the other hand, nationalism, national interests and the role of a 
nation-state present driving forces for using Olympic diplomacy as 
a soft-power tool by emerging states. Furthermore, different interest 
groups use the Olympics to promote their goals. At the very beginning, 
one of the fundamental principles of the modern Olympics, developed 
by Baron Pierre de Coubertin, and embedded in the Olympic Charter, 
was the prohibition of any forms of propaganda or advertising related to 
any political, religious or racial issues. However, this policy has changed 
meaning and it is now quite easy to use the Olympic idea to manipulate 
the public mood (Luša in Jović 2016: 229-283). In the case of the emerging 
host states there are certain groups using the Olympic Games, which in 
themselves are highly politicised, and reflect the global political situation, 
to fight their battles. Russia is an example in which activists put a spotlight 
on the disrespect for human rights and media freedoms and called for 
boycotting the Sochi Winter Olympic Games in 2014 (Sorkonin 2013). 
The Beijing Olympic games were also encountered with several calls for 
boycotts organised by different organisations such as the International 
Campaign for Tibet, Students for a Free Tibet, as well as by many prominent 
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political and media figures. Bittnerová (2009: 10) distinguishes two types of 
pressures host countries can be put under: one being tactical, referring 
to attention drawn away from sports to any domestic and international 
issues, and the other being ideational by calling upon often authoritarian 
regime for differences between itself and the Olympic values. For example, 
the Brazilians, during their political turmoil9, wanted to use the Games to 
highlight their grievances, but both the Olympic Committee and Brazil’s 
government warned that political acts are not allowed inside Olympic 
venues (Garcia-Navarrro 2016).
Although the Olympics have been conceived to promote unity, 
cooperation and global understanding, except from particular groups 
and movements fighting for their cause, the emerging host states use 
Olympic diplomacy to promote different national agendas on the 
world stage. Namely, the Olympics present a tension between the joy of 
participation and the competition between representatives of nations. 
Even though the existence of organisations such as the IOC (International 
Olympic Committee) shows some kind of the supranational governance 
of sport, nation-states remain important with international competitions 
organised around national teams. According to Large (2016), “the games 
succeeded because they indulge precisely what they claim to transcend 
– the world’s basest instinct for tribalism.” Going back to the past one 
can notice that in authoritarian states where the Government had direct 
control over sport (Soviet Union, Germany, Italy and Spain), sporting 
competitions were therefore “circumscribed by political considerations 
that often transformed purely sporting contests into other rivalries: 
communism v. capitalism, fascism v. liberal democracy, communism v. 
social democracy” (Riordan 2003: 1). In the 1930s, sports played the most 
important role in shaping of Italian national glory abroad (Gordon and 
London 2006: 41-65), while the Berlin Olympics were the most controversial 
games even during the bidding process. As for the Cold War period, 
sport became an alternative means of competition between Americans 
representing liberal democracy and the free market, and the Soviets 
representing communism (Kobierecki 2013: 55). When the domination of 
the Soviet Union and other communist countries became more evident 
9 “Dilma Rousseff, Brazil’s elected president has been suspended and was awaiting an impeachment trial in the Senate 
for fiscal mismanagement” (Garcia-Navarrro 2016).
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (79) - 2017
82
in the 1960s, Americans realised that sport is a matter of international 
prestige and went on to win the most medals in the 1964 and 1968 Olympic 
Games. The situation changed again in favour of the Eastern bloc in the 
1970’s, while the 1980’s can be called the era of sports boycotts (ibid.: 58). 
Medal counting and competition between two confronting blocks prove 
how the Games were misused for political purposes and for promoting 
national interests during the Cold War (Luša in Jović 2016: 229-283).
The use of Olympic diplomacy by the host emerging states, aiming to 
reinforce national sentiment, national ideas and identities, which proves 
sport is never detached from the concept of nation, is particularly vivid. 
We claim that Olympic Games hosted by China, Brazil and Russia point 
at the heterogeneous side of globalisation, where Olympic diplomacy is 
used as a soft power tool to promote national interests. A country’s initial 
ambition is to participate at the Olympic Games, which is followed by the 
incentive to host the Games and finally to win more medals to become a 
leading Olympic power. 
Olympic diplomacy at the Beijing, Sochi and Rio 
Olympic Games
With the slogan “One World, One Dream” symbolizing the Chinese 
renaissance and the harmonisation of the world civilisation, China, which 
hosted the Olympics in 2008 (Beijing), attempted to mark its integration 
in the international community (Müller and Steyaert in Munoz 2013: 141). 
However, it used the Games to underscore exceptionalism, to restore 
the pride in its tradition and promote a set of ideas that would appeal 
also to states disconnected from the Western dominance. The process of 
organising the Games for China had to balance between international 
openness and nationalist tendencies. It was also supposed to create 
the perception of contemporary China as a world power without being 
labelled as “the sick man of East Asia” (Tan and Houlihan 2013: 134). 
Athletes and coaches were dispatched abroad, aiming to improve their 
performance and skills, simultaneously with welcoming foreign coaches to 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (79) - 2017
83
bring new knowledge and resources.10 Xu (2006: 92) argues that “sport has 
been another frontier of New China’s struggle for international legitimacy 
and prestige”. 
After the 2008 Summer Olympic Games had been awarded to China, 
the relationship between the Games, patriotism, national unity and 
modernisation has constantly been highlighted. “The passion of the 
Chinese nation, the excitement and the feeling of pride erupted like 
a volcano” (Fan et al. 2011: 35). Beijing’s two bids11 for the Olympics 
reflected its strong economic development and its increasingly important 
role on the international political stage. The hosting of the Olympics 
signalled China’s position not only outwardly but also within the country’s 
borders, in its efforts to unify the people and strengthen national identity. 
Therefore, “a key success of the Beijing Games was in fostering Chinese 
nationalism” (Polson and Whiteside 2016: 3089 -3090). During the bidding 
process for the Olympic Games to be held in 2008, China relied on different 
Olympic diplomacy strategies such as publicising the bid nationally and 
internationally, campaigning worldwide, and investing heavily in their 
athletes who were supposed to “convince everybody about China’s 
modernity and international recognition” (Bitternová 2009:26) . 
The most important showcase of the use of Olympic diplomacy as a soft 
power tool was seen at the opening ceremony aimed at presenting Chinese 
rich history and its success to the world. It was used to represent China as 
modern and innovative: to strengthen the correlation between athletic 
triumph and China’s status as an emerging state, as well as to improve 
its media communication skills (Jianping 2008:6). Olympic diplomacy was 
focused on showing China’s economic advancement by promoting a 
“High Tech” Olympics, in portraying China as politically stable and orderly, 
in asserting China’s achievement of international respectability and in 
addressing environmental issues by promoting a “Green Olympics”. The 
third concept of the Games was “People Olympics” (deLisle in Price and 
Dyan 2008: 19-29). 
10 Zhang, China’s first male champion swimmer who has been training in Australia. This strategy resulted in winning a 
silver medal at the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games in the men’s 400m freestyle and in 2009 he was crowned the world 
champion at the Rome World Championships (Lei 2011). Among 711 sportsmen travelling to Rio, 29 foreign names 
drew attention (Youming 2016).
11 After losing its first bid to Sydney in 1993, Beijing won its second bid in 2001. In 1990, China hosted 11th Asia Games as 
the first major international sporting event on its soil. Despite the strong use of the Olympic diplomacy to win support for 
the hosting of the Games in 2000, China failed which led to “the first explosion of the Chinese nationalism in the reform 
era (Fan et al. 2011:33). The other cities were Toronto, Paris Istanbul and Osaka.
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Except from serving these foreign policy goals, Olympic diplomacy 
was also used to consolidate China’s nationalism resulting with the 
government gaining more popularity and support, or by convincing the 
domestic audience of its legitimacy legitimacy. After China re-joined the 
Olympic movement in the 1970’s, it participated at nine summer Olympic 
games, with the Beijing games presented as the most successful one (Li 
et al. 2007: 3). Its overall medal rankings ranged from eleventh place in 
Seoul in 1988 to first place in Beijing in 2008. The games it hosted were also 
the one at which China participated with the highest number of athletes 
in its Olympic history. China won 100 medals in Beijing in comparison to 
63 in Athens in 2004 (Olympic.cn 2017). This brought official triumphalism 
and strengthened China’s status as a rising sports power. The feelings of 
superiority advanced by the sporting success is associated with nationalism 
as the form of national identification.
On the other hand, the narrative of a globalised China was promoted 
particularly with the slogan “One World, One Dream”, signalising 
cosmopolitanism, harmony and universality. The slogan was used to 
reassure the world that China, which showed its power in organising a 
spectacular mega event, is not a threatening China (Rosner 2009: 10). 
There were also several foreign-designed architectural interventions and 
projects, as well as contributions by Chinese celebrities, which supported 
the cosmopolitan theme of the Games. These narratives served to 
emphasise China’s “deep engagement with the outside world” (deLisle in 
Price and Dyan 2008: 30).
The heterogeneous side of globalisation and the urge to promote 
national interests is also demonstrated in the case of Russia as the host 
of the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014. In July 2007 Russia was 
awarded the Games12 with the opportunity for the country’s return to 
“great power status” (Foxall 2015: 622). Putin’s Federal Target Program for 
the Development of Sochi as a Mountain Climate Resort in 2006-2014, as 
the priority of the Russian government in 2006, presented a part of overall 
Russian Olympic Diplomacy (Petersson and Vamling 2013: 7). According to 
Müller (2011: 2095), the Sochi Games have been characterised as Putin’s 
“pet idea” with the Games having a twofold purpose: using Olympic 
diplomacy “to send a signal of strength and pride” to Russia’s international 
12 The two other selected contenders for hosting the Games were Pyeongchang and Salzburg.
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audience, legitimising Putin’s rule, and showing Russia as a strong global 
player (Haus 2014). Russia decided to focus the opening ceremony on its 
contribution to universal values, literature and music, while simultaneously 
highlighting its power. This was done by showing the most progressive 
actors and stabilising events from its history (Gorenburg 2014). Additionally, 
the recent scandalous revelations of alleged state involvement in doping 
cover-ups at the Sochi 2014 Olympic Games and the suspension of Russian 
athletes from the Rio Olympics, reaffirm that sport, national interests and 
the Olympic Games are connected. According to Ford (2014) “the 
outcome of the Olympics has always had implications for national prestige, 
especially for Russia “whose Olympic success has risen and fallen in step 
with its changing geopolitical fortune” (Ford 2014). Instead, the Sochi 
Games not only affirmed Putin’s popular status but worked to legitimise his 
government (Munt 2015: 42). This strong effort is evident from the fact that 
Russia participated at the Games with 232 athletes winning 33 medals and 
ending up in first place, which is the same result achieved at the Olympics 
held in 1994 in Lillehammer (Olympic.it 2017).
Adding further to the argument of emerging states’ use of Olympic 
diplomacy to promote their national interests, one can notice that the 
hosting of the Olympic Games in 2016 and the FIFA World Cup in 2014 
influenced the strengthening of Brazil’s soft power. Therefore, the Olympic 
Games were fully endorsed by the national government and supported 
by, at the time, president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who stated that “with 
the Olympics Brazil gained its international citizenship and that the world 
has finally recognized it is Brazil’s time” (Horne and Silvestre in Bainer et 
al. 2016: 490). Therefore, the Brazilians realised the importance of hosting 
mega sporting events and have been using it as a very important tool of 
their foreign policy. Brazil’s role as the host country of two international 
mega sporting events gave it a chance to show itself to the world in a 
different light. However, due to the unfolding political turmoil, economic 
decline, a rise in armed violence, mounting environmental problems, 
the Zika virus health crisis, and the surge in social grievances against 
widespread inequality and public corruption, “Brazil’s position as host 
nation was historically perilous” (BBC.com 2016). On the other hand, Brazil 
had a lot to offer as a model for positive social relationships in matters of 
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Brazil’s Olympic diplomacy dates from the beginnings of the Modern 
Olympics and from always being represented at the IOC. The bidding 
for the Olympic Games in 2016 marked Brazil’s fifth attempt, but for the 
first time it went to the second round (Almeida et al. 2014). The success of 
Brazil is also evident from the overall Rio games medal table, according to 
which it participated with its historical record of 465 athletes and occupied 
13th place with 19 medals won. The worst ranking for Brazil was recorded 
during the Sydney Olympic Games in 2000 (52nd place) (Olympic.it 2017). 
Aforementioned experiences from using Olympic diplomacy and hosting 
the Games highlight the role of the nation-state and the opportunity given 
to emerging countries to use sport as a tool for promoting their national 
interests, national identity, and in most cases, to display their nationalism. 
It confirms the role of sports in supporting a state-centric approach. From 
the comprehensive analysis presented here, one can see the Olympic 
Games as an intersection of nationalism, globalisation, and universal 
values. Therefore, we can conclude that as much as sport contributes to 
the unifying process of globalisation, it also strengthens the concept of 
nation by promoting national identities and interests.
Multipolarity, emerging states and hosting the 
Olympic Games
The hosting of the Games represents great prestige, given that 29 Summer 
Games have been held in just 19 countries, and 22 Winter Games have 
been hosted by a total of 11 countries (seven of which also hosted the 
Summer Games). In 121 years, ending with the Summer Olympic Games 
held in Brazil in 2016, 45 out of 51 Olympics were organised in Europe, 
North and Central America and Australia. 
Pierre de Coubertin, founder of the modern Olympic Games, saw them 
as a tool to overcome social inequalities, and a way for economically 
disadvantaged people to access sport. However, despite his intentions, 
“the Games have been dominated by a handful of states and by Euro-
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centrism” (IPSA.org 2016). Furthermore, in terms of hosting these events 
- producing and marketing the sports equipment, controlling the sports 
federations or relevant decision-making - it is the West that dominates. 
There is a belief, among western politicians and bureaucrats, “that the 
Games should go only to countries that conform to western ideals of 
democracy and human rights” (Brownell 2014).
After London 2012, the Olympic Games are or will be hosted outside the 
“Western world” (The South American continent hosted its first Olympics 
in Rio de Janeiro in 2016, while the next three Olympics hosts are located 
in Asia: Pyeongchang in 2018, Tokyo in 2020 and Beijing in 2022)13, 
which confirms our understanding of sport as a reflection of multipolar 
international relations. According to Kelly (in Kelly and Brownell 2011:7) 
“from Greece (the front of Western civilization) to China (the cradle of 
Asian civilisation), the Olympics were finally transiting from parochialism of 
its Eurocentric philosophy to a more truly global philosophical foundation.” 
This trend raises the question of whether sport is influenced by geopolitics 
and geoeconomics, and follows the shifting of the international system 
towards multipolarity. 
We argue that emerging countries with their Olympic diplomacy managed 
to position themselves as core nations, at least during the Games, having 
in mind that the Olympics illustrate the power of a nation. Furthermore, 
the shift of Olympic Games hosts symbolises a form of multipolarity in 
sports, emerging as multipolarity in politics that is setting in. China, South 
Africa and Brazil (members of the BRICS) have managed to become 
the hosts of Olympic Games and FIFA World Cups, which signals their 
respective arrival as credible powers. At the same time, it demonstrates 
“the new order of things not only in international sports, but also in the 
international system” (Grix and Lee 2013). Even during the Summit of the 
BRISC in 2011 the future cooperation was, among other, conditioned by 
organising successful Olympic Games and World Cups in Russia and Brasil 
(IPSA.org 2016). Global shifts are also evident from the fact that “Soviet-
American duopoly gave way to Sino-American duopoly” in winning 
medals at the Olympic (16% of all medals won in Sydney, 17% in Athens, 
13 Except from hosting there is also an evident increase of non-traditional western powers biding for the Summer Games: 
China, Turkey, Brazil and Uzbekistan for the 2000 Games; Argentina, South Africa, Turkey, Brazil, Russia and Puerto Rico 
for the 2004 Games; Turkey, Japan, Cuba, Egypt, Malaysia and Thailand for the 2008 Games; Russia, Cuba, Turkey 
and Brazil for the 2012 Games; Japan, Qatar, Czech Republic and Azerbaijan for the 2016 Games; Qatar, Turkey and 
Azerbaijan for the 2022 Games ( Wikipedia.org 2017).
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22% in Beijing, 20% in London and 19% in Rio). However, India presents 
the greatest counter-example in showing that political multipolarity and 
sports multipolarity are “cast from the same mould”. Furthermore, Russia 
and China are the only BRICS countries represented at the top 10 medal 
winner list from 2000 onwards. 
Confirming the influence of political shifts in sport, Pound (2004: 198-
199) argues that for some members of the IOC the starting point for 
deciding on the host city are geopolitical considerations. There is always 
a vivid discussion whether the country was selected only because of 
its achievements, or if it was perceived as a part of the wider region. 
According to Wallerstein (2009), “there is a geopolitical rationale behind 
the decision, which favored Brazil as a representative of the South”. Brazil 
hosted the 2007 Pan American Cup, the 2014 FIFA World Cup, as well as 
the 2016 Olympic Games, almost 50 years after Mexico City hosted the 
Games in 1968. This serves not just as the announcement of its readiness 
to join the advanced Western capitalist states, but “to indicate its shift 
from a regional actor to a global actor in international affairs” (Grix and 
Lee 2013: 14). There are always disputes whether the host country also 
presents a wider region. Brazil, with the significant power, acted as a “rare 
island of stability in a region of turmoil” (Fendrick 2013: 25). Its significance 
was also reaffirmed by the IOC statement that the bid for the 2016 Games 
“was not only national, but also of South America, a continent that never 
hosted the Games” (Almeida et al. 2014).
 Another case of multipolar trends is Beijing hosting the Games. According 
to Grix and Lee (2013: 12), “China’s Olympics could be read as an attempt 
to present the nation that has shifted from being a regional superpower 
to a global power”. Breslin (2013: 623) argues that “China has become 
a more active and involved actor in global affairs not attempting to be 
part of a core, occupied by advanced capitalist states, but rather an 
emerging, alternative power to those in the West.” “Unlike Brazil, which 
called forth message of both regional and national development, China 
was in it for the good of China” (Fendrick 2013: 34). However, according 
to some authors, the Beijing Games also had regional significance and 
were used “to bring an Asian dimension to the Olympics” (Kelly in Kelly 
and Brownell 2011: 2), by presenting only the fifth games held in Asia 
(Tokyo 1964, Sapporo 1972, Nagano 1998, Seoul 1988 and Beijing 2008). 
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Finally, the Sochi Games were “all about Russia’s return to power and 
more indicative of a post- Cold War rise of Russia, than it is of regional 
development” (Fendrick 2013:30). 
Although the five rings represent the continents participating at the games, 
Africa is still a blank space on the Olympic hosting map. Developing 
countries have been excluded and marginalised from hosting the 
Games, through a very expensive bidding and hosting process and the 
role of geopolitics, although the Olympic ideal promotes sport as being 
available to all people on all continents. 
Developing countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, must 
overcome many challenges to reach their goal of hosting the Games. 
The known African bids for the Olympics are South Africa for 2004, Egypt 
for 2008, while South Africa and Kenya announced their bids for 2024 
(Fendrick 2013: 51). According to the Olympic Charter, the IOC was 
supposed to suspend any discrimination policies, a responsibility it failed 
to uphold to developing countries. Therefore, we argue that sporting 
events conceal the geopolitical “standings” of the host nation. This view 
is confirmed by Immanuel Wallerstein (2009), who found that “geopolitics 
has never been absent from the games.” 
Going into the past, one can find interesting data about developed 
countries exclusively hosting the Summer and Winter Games from 1928 
through 1964. With the exclusion of Mexico in 1968, Beijing in 2008 and Rio 
in 2016, all other Olympic Games were hosted by developed rich Western 
countries (the same goes for the Winter Games if Russia and the former 
Yugoslavia were categorised as emerging economies) (Baade and 
Matheson 2015: 3). However, from 2008 BRICS countries hosted or will host 
four Games. What these countries have in common, despite their many 
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Conclusion
The three case-studies presented in this article clearly show that except 
from the unifying pattern, the Olympic Games are also a reflection of 
particular national interests and the strive for power, especially among 
emerging states. The appearance of some of the BRICS states as Olympic 
host nations follows the shift to multipolarity as evident within international 
relations.
One of the reasons behind this trend, except from particular national 
interest, geopolitics and emerging new powers on the global stage, are 
the interest groups in search of new markets and the role of geoeconomics. 
Firstly, the cost of the Games presents the main argument why they are 
moving away from the developed West. Having in mind that a city’s nor 
a country’s government “receives no direct revenues from hosting the 
Olympics, the financial revenues must come from a Games-generated 
economic boost and increased tourism “(Koorep 2016: 33). Therefore, 
developed countries, which already have high-income economies have 
very little to win from hosting the Games. 
Secondly, the Olympic hosting costs for BRICS countries, where resources 
are scarce and the fiscal balance more fragile are far greater. Scholars 
analysing the economics of hosting sporting mega-events warn “that 
such events fail to deliver the ‘economic bonanza’ promised by the event 
organisers, and that the benefits and costs are disproportionally shared” 
(Baade and Matheson 2015: 1). However, with each bidder trying to 
outdo the others, expenditures increased (Zimbalist 2015: 1). 
Thirdly, there is the new market hypothesis. The hosting of mega-events 
presents an intensified competition for public attention and investment. 
Companies strive to associate themselves with the Games, in an effort to 
gain access to new markets with high profit potential. Therefore, a part 
of the rationale behind the choice for the Olympic Games’ hosts is the 
geopolitics of expanding markets (Müller and Steyaert in Munoz 2013: 139-
140), with India, China and Brazil being among the four largest economies 
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by 2030 (Grix and Lee 2013: 14). There are also corporate sponsors, who 
see the interest in their involvement in financing mega-events by selling 
products and reaching the largest potential market. According to Baade 
and Matheson (2015: 7), the global audience for the Summer Olympics 
is around 3.2 billion people. It is why a conclusion can be made that 
“multinational sponsors now want to target the emerging economies 
around the world rather than battling over one or two market share points 
in the oversaturated west” (Gibson 2010). Therefore, BRICS as the engine 
of the global market, represents a fertile ground for sponsors (Kirillov 2008: 
38). 
Fourthly, the bidding countries’ nominal GDP might be considered as a 
factor, as well. Economic development was the idea behind the BRICS 
countries’ desire to host the Olympics, the World Cup or the Commonwealth 
Games. Together, BRICS “hold more than 40% of the world’s population 
and about 20% of the world’s GDP” (Menhart 2016). Curi et al. (2011) argue 
that a “BRICS-style of hosting sports mega-events may be emerging”.14 
These states “have shown that they are not backward or incompetent, 
thereby challenging the developed states” (Fendrick 2013: 25).
According to the analysis presented in this paper, it is evident that 
the world of sports is a reflection of the world of politics. It is becoming 
multipolar, with emerging countries hosting mega sporting events. Most 
of these countries use such events to announce their arrival on the world 
stage as global players. Although the hegemonic control of sports still 
remains with the Western world, which is trying to impose a consumption 
of narrow capitalist and Western sports culture, this has not led to a 
complete homogenisation. The Olympic Games still contribute to the 
heterogeneous side of globalisation, with non-Western states reinforcing 
national identities and promoting their own values and interests on a 
global scale. Globalisation has not flattened the world and we can still 
see a far-reaching contribution of Olympic diplomacy to nation-building 
and national pride. 
There are evident differences between emerging countries in terms 
of hosting the Games, as well as other parameters, which are decisive 
14 Beijing hosted the Olympic Games in 2008, Delhi the Commonwealth Games in 2010, South Africa the FIFA World Cup 
in 2010, Russia the Winter Olympic Games in 2013 and the FIFA World Cup in 2018, and Brazil the Pan American Games 
in 2007, the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016.
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for the shifting trends in the world of sports. Except for the geopolitical 
dimension of selecting the host country by recognising the hierarchy of 
the IOC as the supreme authority in all matters related to the Games 
(as well as the state of world politics), there is also a geo-economic 
dimension. This includes broadcast revenues and corporate sponsorships 
that acknowledge the capacity of sports to attract large audiences. 
These, along with the membership structure of the IOC, profit oriented 
sponsors, and other particular interests demonstrate the interconnection 
between geo-economics and the world of sports.
Finally, in many cases, hosting the Games is perceived as an Olympic 
diplomacy strategy and a soft power tool. Nations and cities seek to 
host the Games with the expectation that it will significantly boost their 
economies. However, scholars seem to agree that the benefits of hosting 
are generally not substantial enough to ensure an economic shift.15  The 
payoff might be realised only in the long run. According to Zimbalist (2015) 
“the main legacy consists of white elephants that cost billions to build and 
millions annually to maintain, along with mountains of debt that must be 
paid back over ten to thirty years.” 
15 Of the $3.85 billion from television rights in the period from 2009-2012, 56 percent came from the U.S. right fees. It is 
striking that the IOC does not share a large portion of the generated revenue with the Organizing Committee (less 
than 50 percent of the TV revenue) (Zimbalist 2015).
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